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Abstract
Wearables are becoming more computationally
powerful, with increased sensing and control
capabilities, creating a need for accurate user
authentication. Greater control and power allow
wearables to become part of a personal fog system, but
introduces new attack vectors. An attacker that steals a
wearable can gain access to stored personal data on
the wearable. However, the new computational power
can also be employed to safeguard use through more
secure authentication. The wearables themselves can
now perform authentication. In this paper, we use gait
identification for increased authentication when
potentially harmful commands are requested. We show
how the relying on the processing and storage inherent
in the personal fog allows distributed storage of
information about the gait of the wearer and the ability
to fully process this data for user authentication locally
at the edge. While gait-based authentication has been
examined before, we show an additional, low-power
method of verification for wearables.

1. Introduction
Wearables are becoming ubiquitous for consumers.
Smartwatches, wireless headphones, fitness trackers,
and even medical wearables, such as insulin pumps and
heart rate monitors, are becoming commonplace in the
lives of millions of consumers. These devices collect
significant data about the user. Heart rate, movement,
location data, activity level, and, in the case of medical
wearables, private medical data about the user. The
amount of data collected makes wearables an enticing
target for attackers.
While the ubiquity has increased, so too has the
power and storage of the wearables themselves.
Devices like the Apple Watch 3 [1] or Samsung Gear
[19] are both capable of performing major processing
for apps that can be loaded directly into the internal
storage of the watch. We also see increased power in
devices like the Here One [7] that can process audio
and remove or amplify specific sounds from a user’s
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environment. This shows that wearables, as is the case
with most technology, are moving towards the point
where wearables are as capable as our current phones.
In fact, the Apple Watch has about the same processing
power as the iPhone 4 [9].
With the increase in processing power of the
wearables, it becomes possible to make the wearables
be edge nodes in a fog architecture. When combined
with an additional base station layer, this architecture
becomes a personal fog [22], in which all fog nodes are
owned by the user. By using the personal fog, it is
possible to process the data collected by the wearable’s
sensors directly on the wearable and make additional
decisions, either for security or for app functionality.
The computational load can also be shared by all peer
fog nodes, rather than only the wearable or only its
base station.
Unfortunately, with the increased power, data
collection, and other functional capabilities of
wearables, there is a risk that, if the wearable falls into
the wrong hands, it could allow an attacker to gain
personal information about the original user. For
example, Android Smart Lock [10] allows devices that
have been declared by the user to be trusted to unlock
the users’ phone. Thus, as long as the trusted wearable
is within Bluetooth range the phone will be unlocked.
This accessibility poses a serious security risk. An
attacker needs only to steal a trusted wearable and the
phone to gain access to all data stored on the phone.
The idea behind the Android Smart Lock system is
to allow the user to have increased privacy without
compromising convenience. However, especially with
the trusted devices option, this feature goes too far in
opening the door for attackers. It would be better for
the user if there was a method of using their data from
their wearables to authenticate the user without the
user needing to perform any major action, but in a way
that, if an attacker managed to gain access to the
wearable and base station, they would not be able to
access the user’s personal data.
In this paper, we use a user’s gait for authentication
when attempting to perform tasks that may be harmful
to the user should an attacker have access to the
wearable/base station. We choose gait as our
authentication method because it is unobtrusive for the
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user (a user does not need to perform any additional
identification beyond standard use), is easily collected
with existing wearables and base stations, and has been
used by other researchers as a method of user
identification with high accuracy. We propose the use
of the personal fog to distributed stored data on each
fog node to all fog nodes in the system, allowing
independent verification by each fog node to ensure a
potentially compromised fog node does not allow an
attacker to gain access to a user’s personal data. We
show that Pearson correlation can be used as a lowcomputational cost method of authentication and
confirm that the additional time to verify is negligible
for the user.

2. Background
Gait-based authentication has been examined by
other researchers. Boyle et al. [3] used the Euclidean
norm of accelerometer readings and a k Nearest
Neighbors algorithm to identify users’ gaits. They were
fairly accurate, though in some cases they had an
accuracy of as low as 70%. Sharma et al. [20] used
image processing techniques to identify walkers with a
97.5% accuracy. Papavasileiou et al. [18] used “Smart
Socks” to authenticate users by their gait. They
achieved perfect recognition, though they were only
comparing between the two socks. Ho et al. [8] used a
phones accelerometer to detect user’s gait. They
combined the data from the x, y, and z axes and used a
Bayesian classification to identify the user. In most
cases, they achieved an accuracy of between 69.7 and
100%.
Xu et al. [23] used a smartwatch for gait
authentication. Their method requires significant
computation to use, as it performs pre-processing and
focuses on identifying walking, running, and idling for
its identification. Muaaz and Mayrhofer [14] used
adapted Gaussian mixture models to identify users
based on their gait from a cell phone. Their method
also requires significant computation, as they omit
unusual walking cycles and estimate the user’s gait
from the actual data. Their method does allow for
orientation independent verification, however [15].
Cola et al. [5] used a wrist-worn device, simulating a
smartwatch, for their gait analysis. Their method
depends on preprocessing, feature extraction, and
anomaly detection, producing an accuracy between
97.3 and 99.6%.
Gait has been used for purposes other than
identification. Hwang et al. [11] examined gait to
measure walking quality using an Arduino attached to
the user’s leg. They were able to fairly accurately
(between 81.6 and 95.8%) identify different walking

styles. Xu et al. [24] used gait to generate secret keys
between wearable devices and their base stations. Their
method identified the heel strike, which can be
identified by all wearables on the body, to generate
secret keys for encryption of Bluetooth traffic. They
were able to generate keys with an accuracy between
72.1 and 98.3%. However, eavesdroppers were able to
generate keys accurately approximately 50% of the
time, reducing the usefulness of the method.
The fog, despite it being a relatively recent
computing architecture, has been used for a large
number of applications. These applications include
providing resilience at scale [4], robotics ([6], [12]),
data analysis [21], and social sensing for limited
internet connectivity [16]. It is likely the fog could
target many applications that require additional
computing resources, making it ideal for mobile and
Internet of Things applications.

3. The Personal Fog
In this section, we describe how wearables can
interact within the personal fog. In the personal fog
described in [22], wearable devices have additional
processing and storage capabilities. This assumption
reflects the increasing capabilities of devices such as
the Apple Watch and the Samsung Gear, which both
contain additional storage space and processing power
for data collection and housing developer apps. Each
wearable is treated as a fog node at the edge, taking
information from the built-in sensors, performing basic
processing and compression, and forwarding that data
to their base station, in this case a phone. While not all
wearables contain this additional processing power, the
personal fog invokes a trend of increasing processing
power to the edge in recent years and makes the
assumption that all wearables will be powerful enough
to function as a fog node.
With the expected increased computational power
of the wearables, it becomes possible for wearables to
reason about their environment without relying on their
base station. In a traditional wearable architecture, the
base station is in complete control of the wearable and,
if the wearable is capable of controlling the base
station (as is the case with smart watches being able to
change/pause music or unlock the phone), the base
station must relinquish its control to the wearable.
There is no additional verification performed to ensure
the wearable is not being used by an attacker to control
the phone. With the personal fog, and the additional
computational power on the edge, the wearables can
make local decisions, based on their sensor data, to
verify the user.
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The architecture of the personal fog is depicted in
Figure 1. Note that the wearables act as a fog node
connected directly to their sensors. The wearables are
connected directly to the base station, which can
communicate directly with the cloud. By making the
wearables their own fog nodes, it becomes possible to
maintain the structure of a fog while ensuring that all
nodes except the cloud are owned by the user, creating
a true personal fog.

Figure 1. The Personal Fog Architecture
We place a common app on each personal fog
node, i.e. the wearables and the base station. This app
can process the collected data at the edge wearable in
the personal fog to determine if the user is in an
insecure environment, as described in [22]. The base
station can also perform the data collection and
determination. The wearable analyzes only its own
data and compares it against internal rules that assess
the environmental parameters and determine the
security status. The base station aggregates data from
all connected wearables to perform its own
determination of the current security status. If either
denote insecure as the status, then the devices react to
that state until a secure status is verified.
Imagine a user has a Garmin Smartwatch. This
watch allows the user to set up the watch to reply to
text messages, unlock the users phone, and view
notifications, even if the phone does not show the full
notification on screen. If an attacker gets access to the
watch and the base station, the attacker will gain access
to the user’s phone, even if the user has a strong
password or fingerprint verification enabled. If the user
did not set up the watch to be able to unlock their
phone, the attacker will still be able to read messages
and reply to texts as the user. Such scenarios can be

prevented by the additional power granted to wearables
by the personal fog, allowing the wearable to locally
process and verify the user based on data collected by
its own sensors or peer wearables.
The architecture of the personal fog is not required
for the wearable to verify with only its own data.
However, this verification method could be faked by
an attacker. The attacker needs only to get root access
to the wearable and force the stored data used for
verification to be replayed. With the interconnectivity
of the personal fog, the verification data can be spread
across all devices, where each device can verify all
other device data. In this way, authentication is
performed by all devices and, should the user fail
authentication, the fog nodes can shift into an insecure
state to prevent further attacks.
It should be noted that, for the purposes of this
paper, we focus only on the interconnectivity between
the wearables and the base station for authentication.
While the cloud is capable of informing the base
station of its state and collecting data from the base
station, there are existing methods of verification for
cloud communication [2]. We do not propose the use
of gait information when communicating with the
cloud, though this may be implemented in the future.
For the purposes of this work, the cloud only
aggregates information about the current security state
of the user and is responsible for informing the user
when they enter an insecure state.

4. Collecting Valid Gait Information
For authentication, we chose to use accelerometer
data of a user walking to verify using the wearer’s gait.
Wearables already collect this data, often using the
accelerometer data to control functions of the device
(smartwatches that light up when the wrist is flicked,
the Apple Watch that opens Siri when watch is brought
up to the users’ mouth). With the additional edge
power granted as part the personal fog architecture, we
can perform additional processing and storage of this
data collected locally by the wearable. The wearable,
running our personal fog app, can identify when the
user is walking, collect valid gait information for
storage and later use, and adapt to potential attacks if
authentication fails.
We focus on a user’s gait primarily because it is
unobtrusive to collect for a user of the personal fog and
its accuracy in identification. Other biometric options
are available, including facial recognition, retinal
patterns, fingerprints, speech recognition, or facial
thermograms [13], but each requires additional work
by the user and additional hardware to be implemented
by device manufacturers. For facial recognition or
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retinal patterns, cameras must be installed in all
wearables and base stations and the user must raise
each device to their face for identification. A similar
issue exists for fingerprinting and facial thermograms.
Speech pattern recognition could work, though any
attacker who has a recording of the users’ voice could
perform verification and user verification may not be
possible in noisy environments.
There are wearables, such as the Nymi band [17],
that use ECG sensors to verify a user by their
heartbeat. This sensor could possibly be used as a more
secure authentication, but a user is required to press
their finger into the device to perform the ECG
reading, adding an additional step, and only the single
device can be used. Until more wearables make use of
an ECG, as well as find a way to eliminate the
additional user step, it is infeasible for the average
consumer to use the device to ensure their information
is secure. Thus, for use with the personal fog, gait is a
very feasible option requiring no additional steps for
verification (save for actual steps when walking) and
no additional burden on device manufacturers.
In order to authenticate a user by their gait there
must be consistent “valid” data collected. This
collection should be performed by the user when they
first set up a new device. It is reasonable to assume that
when a user adds a fog node to their system they are a
valid user.
When a user first sets up their device, our app looks
for accelerometer data that is consistent with walking.
We specifically look for long stretches of rhythmic
jumps in the accelerometer data that imply footsteps.
This examination is done by searching for peaks and
valleys in the data that are relatively close to each other
(local maximums and minimums within a small error
window of about 0.05). We define a valid amount of
data to be greater than 5000 data points, equivalent to
20 seconds of walking.
We then trim this data to the middle 1100 data
points. This cleaning of the data ensures that the data
we rely on is not from the very beginning or very end
of a walk, as in practical tests this data was inconsistent
with normal walking. This reason is because users
being studied would walk slightly more irregularly at
the very beginning or end of their trip, perhaps as a
result of knowing they were carrying a wearable for
testing. It may also be due to a user needing to take a
number of steps to reach a natural stride. We chose to
store 1100 data points so that we can choose 100 data
points for end verification with a starting point
anywhere between the start and the 1000th data point,
allowing some variation in the start and end points
during verification. This choice is not needed but adds
an extra layer of complexity that wearables can use to
verify. When verifying, fog nodes can choose any

point within the 1100 datapoints to use for verification,
provided it meets the requirements for verification,
which are discussed in Section 6.
Once consistent data is collected, it is temporarily
stored. This stored data is then verified as being
accurate the next time a walk is detected. If verification
succeeds, the data is distributed to the other fog nodes
for storage and to be used by the other fog nodes when
verification is required. Once a confirmed consistent
walking pattern is stored on other devices, fog nodes
store only the most recently consistent walking pattern.
This peer storage method allows a wearable to send the
most recently collected gait data to be used when
authentication is required and a user is not walking. It
is likely to be the case often, as users tend to be
stationary for longer periods of time than they are
walking.

5. Distribution of Gait Data
Both wearables and phones, acting as the
wearables' base station, are constantly collecting
accelerometer information, and may tell the user to
move if the user has been stationary for too long. Many
wearables use their accelerometer data to calculate
steps or to recognize the orientation of the device. With
this data, it becomes possible to create a “walking
profile” of the user.
Because wearables are worn on the same parts of
the body (a smartwatch is usually worn on the same
wrist at all times) and the base station is often stored in
a consistent location (pocket, external bag), gait
information from each device will be consistent for
each user. Thus, there is a reasonable expectation that a
user will provide consistent gait information across
their devices when they are walking. While specific
devices may differ (the base station will have different
accelerometer readings than a smartwatch, for
example) the data collected from a single device will
be consistent with that device.
When a wearable attempts to perform an action that
the system or the user has determined to be a potential
security risk, such as unlocking the users phone or
sending a reply message, the wearable attempts to
authenticate with the other nodes in the users personal
fog. Figure 2 shows the flow of this authentication.
First, the wearable requests verification from all
connected nodes in its personal fog. Once the nodes
have responded that they perform the requested
verification, the wearable sends its most recently
collected valid gait data. The fog nodes then verify the
gait data they receive from the wearable. If the gait
data is valid, a fog node sends back a “True” value to
the wearable.
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Figure 2. Communication Flow for Gait Verification
The wearable cannot just accept this true value as
being valid, however. An attacker may attempt to
fool the device by intercepting the transmissions
using a man-in-the-middle attack and send back a
“True” value regardless of the actual verification
result. To prevent this spoofing, the other fog nodes
also send their most recent gait data to the wearable.
The wearable then uses its stored data from those
devices to validate each device. Once validated, the
wearable can assume the previous response is correct
and, if the user has been authenticated, perform the
action the user attempts. If the response is not
validated or the wearable receives a “False” value, it
blocks the action and shifts into an insecure state,
preventing additional attacks.
There can be an issue when the wearable is connected
to a new base station and does not yet have a copy of
the base station’s gait profile. In this case, if there are
no other peer wearables available in the personal fog,
the wearable will assume it is not allowed to perform
any of the potentially harmful actions that require
authentication. While this problem means the user
would be unable to use their device without
additional authentication methods, it is temporary,
since the base station will provide the wearable with
gait data once the user has walked with the new base
station.

6. Authenticating Gait Data
To authenticate the gait data, we propose a simple
method based on Pearson Correlation. By correlating
the data in this way, we reduce the computational
power needed to perform the verification so that it
can be performed by a wearable. Other methods, such
as those described in the background, can be used as
well.
For our method, we take the first 1000 datapoints
and find a series of datapoints from the middle of a
walking cycle. We select the next 100 datapoints for
validation. More datapoints could be used, but a
smaller number allows for more variation in speed of
walk cycles, as a user may have slowed down or sped
up within a walk. Minor variation could cause issues
with the correlation for a larger number of datapoints.
We then use the 100 datapoints directly following the
initial peak. This separation allows our method to
always begin on a peak and makes it significantly
more likely to begin on a consistent walking cycle.
We then run a Pearson correlation on the 100
datapoints.
One problem with running a pure Pearson correlation
on gait data is that attackers could correlate with the
user by virtue of walking “together”. In such a case, a
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Pearson correlation will show a significant
correlation (p < 0.01) between the two users because
both users will have similar, though slightly different,
peaks and valleys just from the act of walking to
maintain the same stride. This situation is obviously a
problem with using Pearson correlation for
verification.
To prevent this issue, we look only for data which
has an r-value above a preset threshold. The r-value
is used is a value between -1.0 and 1.0 that represents
how associated two variables are. A value of -1.0
shows there is a negative relation, while a value of
1.0 shows they are completely related. A value of 0.0
represents no relation. Correlation between two
different gaits is inevitable, but the degree of
correlation is not. By specifying a threshold that must
be met to authenticate a user, we can ignore even
strong correlations that may arise as a result of both
user’s gaits being correlated based only on both sets
of walking data. We choose a threshold of 0.70 for
our tests, though modification by the user is an option
for increased security.

Figure 3. Verification of Gait by Legitimate User

Figure 4. Attempted Verification of Gait by
Attacker

7. Evaluation
To evaluate our system, we conducted a small test
with 6 attackers and 5 legitimate attempts at
verification. For each test, users, acting as an
attacker, were asked to hold a Raspberry Pi, acting as

a wearable, in their right hand to mimic a
smartwatch. They then walked approximately 3000
feet to measure their gait. All attackers walked the
same route that the verification data was collected on.
Attackers ranged in height and gait-length, with one
attacker having the same height and gait-length of the
legitimate user and the other attackers having a
smaller height and gait-length. For the verification of
the original user, our legitimate user walked the
initial route to collect the verification data. The user
then walked the same route on a different day and 4
different routes at different times over the course of a
week.
A graphical representation of one legitimate
verification attempt can be seen in Figure 3 and one
attacker attempting to verify can be seen in Figure 4.
The stored gait data is shown in solid lines, while the
data being verified is shown in dashed lines.
These graphs are intended to show that, at a
glance, the gaits are different enough to say they are
indeed different users. To show that verification
worked as intended, we then ran a Pearson
correlation on each of the attackers and legitimate
user data. Results of verifying the legitimate user can
be seen in Table 1, while attempted verification of
the attackers can be seen in Table 2.
When examining these tables, the methodology
looked for verification between X values, Y values,
and Z values, based on the assumption that the
wearable is held in the same orientation in the same
hand across tests. This assumption reflects common
usage since users wear their devices in approximately
the same area. Thus, when looking for correlations,
we are only looking at the values starting from an X
correlation and going diagonally down to the Z
correlation. For example, the X values of each walk
are correlated with the stored X values, the Y values
are correlated with the stored Y values, and the Z
values are correlated with the stored Z values.
Correlating X values with Y or Z values are not
examined.
In Table 1, we can see that all additional walks
correlate strongly with the stored gait data. The
lowest correlation, Walk5 Z, still correlates at a value
of r = 0.71 with Stored Z. This gives a p-value of p <
0.00001. Of note, however, is that any r value greater
than 0.256 will give us a p-value less than 0.01. We
expect this result, as any two users walking will have
a correlation that they are walking. Our methodology
relies on incredibly high r values to identify a user by
their gait. Interestingly, the Y and Z values are all
highly negatively correlated. For example, Walk5 Z
is negatively correlated with Stored Y at r = -0.71.
This result could be added into the verification
process in the future as an additional check to
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authenticate a user, though more research would be
needed to confirm it is the case for all users. It is
possible that it is just a result of the style of gait that
the legitimate user has.
Table 2 indicates that none of the attacker’s gaits
correlate at a level we expect for verification. The
highest correlation comes from attacker 4, with both
of their X and Y values correlating at a value r > 0.5,
and from attacker 6, who had a Y value correlated at
r = 0.65. These values are lower than the 0.71
minimum found with a legitimate user and below the
0.7 valued expected for verification. Interestingly, the
highest correlations came not from correlating the X,
Y, and Z values with the users corresponding X, Y,
and Z values, but with correlations between X, Y,
and Z values. For example, Attacker 5’s Z value had
a strong negative correlation (-0.75) with the user’s X
value.
It is possible that an attacker can try to mimic the
user’s gait, especially if the attacker is familiar with
their target. To examine this scenario, we recruited
two subjects, one of the same height and leg length as
the legitimate user and one of a different height and
leg length, attempting to mimic the user’s gait. Both
walked directly next to the original user, allowing
them to ensure their steps matched the user as closely
as possible. Each attacker attempted to mimic the
user’s gait twice.
Table 1. Pearson Correlation of Legitimate
User

Stored X
Stored Y
Stored Z
Walk1 X
Walk1 Y
Walk1 Z
Walk2 X
Walk2 Y
Walk2 Z
Walk3 X
Walk3 Y
Walk3 Z
Walk4 X
Walk4 Y
Walk4 Z
Walk5 X
Walk5 Y
Walk5 Z

Stored X
1
-0.13462
0.20493
0.921468
-0.21378
0.056176
0.899738
-0.12032
0.009094
0.915283
-0.20816
0.132923
0.812616
-0.24806
0.084646
0.890756
-0.3287
0.200942

Stored Y

Stored Z

1
-0.85757
-0.06334
0.919074
-0.76916
-0.19281
0.817692
-0.80609
-0.27262
0.907648
-0.85172
0.039542
0.873684
-0.7836
-0.29117
0.845019
-0.71473

1
0.161636
-0.90257
0.871817
0.259065
-0.8325
0.897764
0.330213
-0.87047
0.921374
0.160344
-0.85932
0.83035
0.418455
-0.71493
0.717343

Table 2. Pearson Correlation of Attacker

Stored X
Stored Y
Stored Z
Attacker1 X
Attacker1 Y
Attacker1 Z
Attacker2 X
Attacker2 Y
Attacker2 Z
Attacker3 X
Attacker3 Y
Attacker3 Z
Attacker4 X
Attacker4 Y
Attacker4 Z
Attacker5 X
Attacker5 Y
Attacker5 Z
Attacker6 X
Attacker6 Y
Attacker6 Z

Stored X
1
-0.13462
0.20493
-0.6623
-0.14655
0.462857
0.048722
0.314086
-0.36024
-0.12285
0.196888
0.166804
0.569107
0.155689
-0.13
-0.65764
-0.10304
-0.7479
-0.24377
-0.55745
-0.17141

Stored Y

Stored Z

1
-0.85757
0.325599
0.474359
-0.52557
-0.27774
-0.42231
0.305483
-0.58759
-0.51463
0.4271
-0.18589
0.552398
-0.45604
0.246436
-0.3374
0.502703
-0.54304
0.649798
0.30546

1
-0.54795
-0.33881
0.491506
0.071827
0.221583
-0.34226
0.545348
0.415218
-0.49472
0.220556
-0.32765
0.240945
-0.35979
0.055477
-0.43321
0.430248
-0.71654
-0.43277

Table 3 shows the result of the attackers
attempting to mimic the user’s gait. Mimic 1 and 2
are the attacker of the same height and leg length and
Mimic 3 and 4 are the attacker of a different height
and leg length. Interestingly, the highest correlation
at r = 0.57 occurred with the attacker of a different
height and leg length. If we allow the Z direction to
be correlated with Y, the attacker of the same height
and leg length has a maximum correlation of r =
0.62. However, all of these are below the 0.7 value
set for gait verification of the user.
We also validate the time it takes to run the
Pearson correlation and transfer the required data via
Bluetooth. We ran the Pearson correlation 100 times
on the wearable security testbed. On average, the
Pearson Correlation took 0.19 milliseconds to run.
For the time it takes to send the validation data via
Bluetooth, we tested sending the data as a batch of
100 values to two devices. We sent our test data a
total of 954 times, taking an average of 5.22
milliseconds. These two results show that the time it
takes to verify the user is minimal, around 6
milliseconds on average. This result is fast enough to
ensure that the use of multiple different devices for
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verification and storage will not slow the user down
significantly. It is below the 40ms used by movies to
simulate smooth motions and, thus, will not be
noticed by the user.
Table 3. Pearson Correlation of Attacker
Mimicing User

Stored X
Stored Y
Stored Z
Mimic1 X
Mimic1 Y
Mimic1 Z
Mimic2 X
Mimic2 Y
Mimic2 Z
Mimic3 X
Mimic3 Y
Mimic3 Z
Mimic4 X
Mimic4 Y
Mimic4 Z

Stored X
1
-0.1346
0.20493
-0.1776
0.32715
-0.0097
-0.4989
0.44001
0.03235
-0.1993
0.08862
0.0272
0.57266
-0.1889
-0.0135

Stored Y

Stored Z

1
-0.8576
-0.3051
-0.5582
0.64248
0.00445
-0.5401
0.63008
-0.4968
-0.5414
0.42123
-0.3955
0.14998
0.26993

1
0.09857
0.52614
-0.5999
-0.2864
0.49955
-0.5612
0.32709
0.55538
-0.4385
0.32645
-0.061
-0.0707

8. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we extend gait-based verification
techniques and apply the concept of gait-based
authentication to the personal fog architecture.
Within the personal fog, we shift the authentication
requirements from the local wearable to all connected
fog nodes. This shift allows verification of multiple
different gait profiles from different locations on the
body and prevents an attacker from accessing
personal information from stolen wearables. With the
additional power assumed by the personal fog, we
allow all connected fog nodes to independently verify
the gait of the user using the recorded gaits of all fog
nodes. We show this method is viable for wearables
through testing using our wearable security testbed.
It is important to note that this method is designed
to be used in small scale. A user’s gait data will only
be passed between their devices, never moving to the
cloud. If this method is implemented on a large scale,
with gait data being stored not just on a user’s own
devices but across multiple fog nodes outside of the
user’s control, the continuous monitoring of the
user’s data and storage in a database by a user could
be exploited by an attacker to identify and target
specific users based on their gait. Ideally, this method

is used only on the layers of the personal fog that the
user has control over and, thus, should never exceed
the number of devices a user can comfortably wear.
This method has limitations. One issue is that, if
an attacker is able to access the wearable without
needing to then walk to a different location, they can
use the existing stored gait information to
authenticate and gain access to the users’ private
information. This outcome would likely not be an
issue in most cases. However, if a user left their
device somewhere, an attacker could gain access
without needing to take the device to another
location. This would require the user to leave all their
wearables and their base station in a single location,
which is unlikely, but more research is needed to
prevent this possible attack.
An attacker with unlimited time to study and
refine a user’s gait may also be able to successfully
mimic the users gait enough to fool our system.
While we tried to address this situation with our own
testers mimicking the stored user’s gait, we did not
provide our attackers with unlimited time to learn and
practice the users gait. Further research is needed to
discover if, given enough time, an attacker could
mimic a user’s gait enough to fool our system.
Another issue with this method is that gait data
could be seen as medically valuable. Gait can be used
to recognize health issues in a user and having their
gait information stored on multiple devices could
allow attackers to gain access to this health
information or be used to diagnose medical
conditions the user was not aware of. Should an
attacker gain access to this information, either
through accessing the stored data itself or through
eavesdropping on the gait data as it is being passed
between devices, they could gain insight into a user’s
health or psychological state. This problem is made
worse if the gait data is passed to a third party for
verification. While we have focused only on using
gait data for identification in a personal fog, where all
devices are owned by the user, the fog, by its very
nature, can have additional nodes outside of the users
control added in the future. We do not recommend
using gait for identification in this case, as an attacker
gaining access to a third-party node would provide
them with the stored data from all users that use that
node.
We would also like to extend this verification
method to other devices and other methods of
verification. User data is often unique enough to be
used for authentication and wearables are constantly
collecting data about their user. It is possible that our
method of storing data for verification across
multiple devices could expand to use more than just
gait data.
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